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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002191

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [KN](#) [NL](#)
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/DPRK: DUTCH WORRIED AND FRUSTRATED
OVER POSSIBLE TEST

REF: STATE 166404

Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Dutch share U.S. concerns about a potential North Korean nuclear test and support international efforts to bring Pyongyang back to the Six Party Talks. They believe the EU and individual European states, however, have minimal influence over North Korean actions, and point to China and the U.S. as potentially influential actors. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Drawing from reftel, Charge on October 5 conveyed to Dutch National Security Advisor Karel van Oosterom our grave concerns over North Korea's announced intention to conduct nuclear tests, emphasizing that we will not accept a nuclear North Korea. Van Oosterom said U.S. concerns "closely reflect our views as well." He termed the North Korean announcement "extremely worrisome."

¶3. (C) In follow-up meetings on October 6, POLCOUNS reviewed reftel points with Henk Swarttouw, acting Director of the MFA's Security Affairs Department, and Joop Scheffers, Director of the MFA's Asia and Oceania Department, as well as Korean desk officers from both departments. Swarttouw and Scheffers echoed van Oosterom's comments, noting that our references to the "unacceptability" of a nuclear North Korea made clear the level of U.S. and international concern.

¶4. (C) Swarttouw stressed that the immediate task of the international community must be to convince Pyongyang not to go ahead with a nuclear test, and then to look at ways to bring the North Koreans back into the six party talks. Scheffers suggested that "at some point" it may be useful to consider offering "carrots" to Pyongyang to change its long-term behavior, but agreed that the international community must first send a clear message that proceeding with a nuclear test was a "no-win option."

¶5. (C) Swarttouw and Scheffers both doubted that actions by the EU or individual European states would have any impact on North Korean decision making, but agreed that maintaining a united front was important. They suggested that the only states likely to have even limited influence with Pyongyang were China, the U.S. and -- to a much lesser degree -- South Korea, Russia, and Japan. Both expressed support for a UNSC Presidential Statement, but worried that moving to a sanctions resolution would be difficult (given a possible Chinese veto) and possibly counterproductive if resulted in increased deprivation at the lower levels of society. They readily acknowledged, however, that the situation suggested no easy options.

BLAKEMAN